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Abstract 
Reducing gender inequality in the workplace is one of the most widely discussed global challenges. This paper inves-
tigates empirically the impact of regulations on female participation in the private sector using panel data for a large 
sample of countries. The metrics examined include female ownership of businesses and female share of employment in 
non-agricultural sectors of the economy. The findings indicate that regulatory constraints tend to place a dispropor-
tionate burden on women and shed new light on the interconnections between business regulations, firm creation, and 
women in the workforce. 
The views expressed by this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Na-
tional Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The research was supported by a grant 
from the Charles Koch Foundation. 
 
1. Introduction1 
A recent report by the McKinsey Global Institute (2015) 
concludes that if women were to participate in the economy 
at a rate equal to men, it would add an estimated $28 tril-
lion, or 26 percent, to the annual global economy in 2025 
compared to a business-as-usual scenario. A more modest 
scenario in which countries matched their best-in-region 
level of gender equality would add an estimated $12 trillion 
in annual 2025 GDP, a doubling of GDP growth compared 
to a business-as-usual scenario. By these estimates, gender 
inequality has substantial implications for global living 
standards, apart from other considerations such as social 
equity and equal opportunity.  
An underutilization of resources of this magnitude gen-
erally signals an aberration from what one might expect 
from a competitive market process. Resources tend to be 
underutilized when markets are constrained or when prop-
erty rights are attenuated. This paper considers one possi-
ble impediment to tackling the challenge of global gender 
inequality: government regulations that affect the ability to 
start and grow a business. A number of studies offer evi-
dence using cross-national data that government regula-
tions have a chilling effect on new business formation. We 
take up the related question of whether the burden of busi-
ness regulations falls disproportionately on women, and, as 
such, offers a partial explanation for the under-
representation of women in business. 
Section 2 discusses the conceptual framework. Section 3 
describes our estimation methodology and presents the 
results. Section 4 offers brief concluding remarks. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
We discuss two potential explanations for why econom-
ic regulations may affect gender inequality in business. The 
first is a simple path-dependence explanation. Historically, 
men have been over-represented in the workforce and as 
firm owners relative to their share of the population. In the 
sample of countries included in our analysis over the peri-
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od 2012 to 2016, women make up 50 of the working age 
population. Women comprise 43 percent of the labor force 
and 45 percent of the population in wage employment in 
the nonagricultural sector (using the median values). Re-
garding firm ownership, 23 percent of new LLCs are owned 
by women, and 32 percent of new sole proprietors are 
women (again using the sample medians). Regulations that 
impede new business entry lock-in this historical ad-
vantage. In other words, regulations as entry barriers tend 
to protect the status quo gender imbalance, and the status 
quo happens to reflect a legacy of male majorities in the 
workforce and in business ownership.  
A second potential explanation is that regulatory con-
straints on competitive market processes facilitate discrim-
ination, whether based on gender or some other character-
istics. In the mid-20th Century economists made great 
strides in formally framing discrimination as utility maxim-
izing behavior in which non-pecuniary benefits such as 
workplace perquisites and employee hiring decisions are 
“rational” alternatives to pecuniary income. The early con-
tributors to this approach included Stigler (1942), Becker 
(1957), and Alchian & Kessel (1962). Leibenstein (1966) 
later formulated the related concept of “x-inefficiency” to 
describe the tradeoff between profits and living the quiet 
life, (“organizational slack”) under non-competitive condi-
tions. Individuals with decision-making power within or-
ganizations make trade-offs between, for example, income 
versus working with employees they find personally desira-
ble. The economics of discrimination framework naturally 
led to a critically important question: what conditions sys-
tematically favor non-pecuniary over pecuniary income, 
thus offering clues to the factors that facilitate discrimina-
tion?  
The answer proposed by Stigler, Becker, Alchian and 
Kessel, Leibenstein, and others is that the absence of a 
competitive market process reduces the cost of discrimina-
tion. The explanation for this relationship is less obvious 
than it may seem; it does not follow directly from the theo-
ry of monopolistic market structure. In theory, the monop-
olist firm that discriminates forgoes profits, just as a com-
petitive firm that discriminates suffers losses. Rather, the 
explanation stems from alternative property right struc-
tures that affect the terms of trade between pecuniary 
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wealth and nonpecuniary business-associated forms of 
satisfaction, such as discrimination. Alchian & Kessel 
(1962, p. 164) states this principle succinctly: “This whole 
analysis is merely an illustration of the effects of restricting 
the operation of the law of comparative advantage by re-
ducing the size of the market (or range of alternatives).” 
In the framework of the property rights theory of the 
firm, a regulatory regime that impedes entry reflects an 
environment in which existing firms, protected from com-
petition, have incentive to avoid being “too” profitable and 
thus attract the attention of regulators, and thereby lose 
their competitive advantage. Thiel & Masters (2014) em-
phasizes this point in the context of why an outside observ-
er cannot distinguish between a monopolistic firm and a 
firm facing fierce competition. This environment tilts the 
terms of trade in favor gender discrimination because the 
value created from hiring the most qualified workers, re-
gardless of gender, is diminished.  
While this paper focuses on government regulation as a 
factor contributing to gender inequality, studies have inves-
tigated other potential causal factors. For example, Klapper 
& Parker (2011, p. 237) conclude that “an analysis of a large 
body of literature does not suggest that, in general, the so 
called ‘gender gap’ in entrepreneurship can be explained by 
explicit discrimination in laws or regulations.” While laws 
or regulations may not discriminate explicitly, polices that 
create barriers to competition and thereby attenuate prop-
erty rights may facilitate discrimination implicitly. 
3. Specification Issues, Models, and Results 
The World Bank’s Doing Business project provides two 
types of data that facilitate empirical analysis of the impact 
of regulations on women in business. One dataset provides 
measures that reflect the policy environment in which 
businesses operate. The second dataset provides measures 
of entrepreneurial activity, including the number of newly 
registered firms, LLCs, and sole proprietorships, and fur-
ther divides these data by gender.  
The Doing Business online database enhances the abil-
ity to examine and analyze the impact of regulations that 
confront small and medium-size enterprises. In his recent 
survey article, Besley (2015) reports that since 2003 over 
2,000 research articles have been published in peer-
reviewed academic journals using these data, and thou-
sands more working papers have been posted online.  
The Besley review cites key empirical studies that pro-
vide the starting point for our analysis. These studies exam-
ine the impact of regulations on firm formation and new 
business activity. Klapper, Leaven & Rajan (2006) finds 
that the rate of firm incorporation in naturally high-entry 
industries is lower in countries where regulatory costs are 
higher. Ciccone & Papaioannou (2007) finds that countries 
with less burdensome regulations are associated with more 
entry in industries that benefited under expansionary glob-
al demand and technology shifts. Klapper, Amit & Guillén 
(2010) finds that business entry per capita is significantly 
related to the number of entry procedures, access to fi-
nance, and broad indicators of an economy’s performance. 
In addition, they find that business density is strongly and 
significantly related to lower barriers to entry and better 
governance. Ardagna & Lusardi (2009, 2010a, and 2010b) 
examine the impact of regulation on entrepreneurship and 
entry using international data. More recently, Divanbeigi & 
Ramalho (2015) find strong evidence that the rules related 
to starting a business are related to the rate of new firm 
creation. Williams, Belton & Graham (2017) provides an 
excellent and thorough survey and review of a host of pa-
pers that examine the impact on regulations on global en-
trepreneurship, firm creation, and economic development. 
In summary, these studies spotlight the importance for new 
firm creation of the business regulatory environment, par-
ticularly those rules that determine the costs of starting a 
business. 
As a first look at the data, we estimate how the level fe-
male ownership of businesses responds to indicators of 
new business creation. The sample for this analysis in-
cludes all countries for which the data are available over 
the time period 2012 through 2016. Table 1 presents sum-
mary statistics for the variables, and Table 2 presents the 
estimation results for three dependent variables:   
▪ New Female LLC Owners as a % of New LLC Owners  
▪ New LLCs with at Least One Female Business Owner as a 
% of New LLCs 
▪ New Female Sole Proprietors as a % of New Sole Proprie-
tors 
The models control the number of New LLC Owners, 
the number of New LLCs, and the number of New Sole 
Proprietors, respectively. The three models also control for: 
▪ Female Population Ages 15-64 (% of Total Population 
Ages 15-64) 
▪ School Enrollment, Secondary (Gross), Gender Parity 
Index 
▪ Year  
The main takeaway from Table 2 is the positive and sig-
nificant relationship between new business creation and 
the share of women owners. The models are estimated in 
double-log form, which means that the coefficients reflect 
elasticities. For example, a one percent increase in new LLC 
owners corresponds to a 0.13 percent increase in the share 
of female LLC owners. A one percent increase in new LLCs 
corresponds to a 0.21 percent increase in New LLCs with at 
Least One Female Business Owner (as a percentage of New 
LLCs). A one percent increase in sole proprietors corre-
sponds to a 0.18 percent increase in the share of New Female 
Sole Proprietors. In sum, growth in LLCs and sole proprietor-
ships are correlated with more than proportionate increases in 
female ownership.  
The second step in the analysis examines the impact of sever-
al measures of business regulations on measures of women in 
business using the model specified in Equation (1). 
Share of Women i,t  = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1Regulation Index 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽i𝑋 
𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1), 
where subscript i stands for country i and subscript t 
stands for year t. We estimate Equation (1) using four indi-
ces of regulation from the Doing Business dataset:  
▪ Number of Entry Procedures—Women (Distance to Fron-
tier) 
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▪ Number of Days Required—Women (Distance to Fron-
tier) 
▪ Ease of Doing Business (Overall Index, Distance to Fron-
tier) 
▪ Enforcing Contracts  (Distance to Frontier) 
We adopt the convention used in prior analyses by using 
transformations of the Regulation Indices, which are 
known as “distance to the regulatory frontier” scores. The 
distance to the regulatory frontier (DTF) score measures 
the average distance from the best regulatory performance. 
In effect, the metrics are normalized between 0 and 100 
with the following formula: 
Regulation Index DTF 𝑖, = 100 − (𝑦𝑖, − 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖)⁄(𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖 − 
𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖), where  
worst i and best i refer to the worst and best perfor-
mances respectively recorded over time for across all coun-
tries. This transform means that increases in the value of 
an index DTF reflects a higher quality regulatory environ-
ment. 
In equation (1) the vector 𝑋 𝑖, includes a set of eight con-
trol variables and the source for these data is the World 
Bank’s World DataBank [online database]: 
▪ GDP per Capita (Constant US$) 
▪ School Enrollment, Secondary (Gross), Gender Parity 
Index 
▪ Female Population Ages 15-64 (% of Total Population 
Ages 15-64) 
▪ Indicator Variable for Muslim Religious Majority in 
Country 
▪ Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
▪ Rule of Law Index 
▪ Control of Corruption 
▪ Year 
The results in Table 3 indicate the effects on New Fe-
male Sole Proprietors as a Share of New Sole Proprietors. 
The results in Table 4 indicate the effects on Women in 
Wage Employment in the Nonagricultural Sector (% of 
Total Employment in the Nonagricultural Sector). In other 
words, Table 3 considers women business ownership, and 
Table 4 considers a broader measure of female participa-
tion in the workplace.  
The findings in both sets of models provide evidence 
that the business regulatory environment has an impact on 
female ownership and female employment. In Table 3, 
improvements in the four measures of the quality of the 
regulatory quality have a positive and significant effect on 
the female share of new sole proprietors. The female share 
of new sole proprietors appears especially responsive to the 
Overall Ease of Doing Business Index, with an elasticity of 
1.70.  
In Table 4, the estimated coefficients for three of the 
four measures of regulatory quality are significant at the 
one-percent level. The coefficient on the Number of Entry 
Procedures for women is positive, but not significant. 
Overall, these findings support the thesis the regulatory 
environment affects the share of women employed in the 
nonagricultural sector. 
4. Concluding Comments 
This paper builds on the empirical studies that examine 
the impact of business regulations on the entry of new 
firms and entrepreneurship. We extend this research by 
examining whether the quality of the business regulatory 
environment has gender-specific effects. Our analysis indi-
cates that regulatory constraints tend to place a dispropor-
tionate burden on female ownership of enterprises and on 
the share of females employed in non-agricultural sectors. 
The findings sheds new light on the interconnections be-
tween business regulations, firm creation, women in the 
workforce, and aggregate economic performance. Gender 
inequality appears to be one of the channels through which 
business regulations adversely affect national economies. 
Annex 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
New Female LLC Owners (% of New LLC Owners) 22% 23% 10% 0% 40% 
New LLCs with at Least One Female Business Owner (% of New LLCs) 30% 24% 28% 1% 215% 
New Female Sole Proprietors (% of New Sole Proprietors) 31% 32% 14% 1% 61% 
Women in Wage Employment in the Nonagricultural Sector (% of Total Em-
ployment in the Nonagricultural Sector) 
41% 45% 10% 6% 55% 
New LLC Owners 48,3 22,584 71,813 156 495,256 
New LLCs 26,528 7,866 62,387 10 663,616 
New Sole Proprietors 85,394 27,621 126,203 548 505,339 
Number of Entry Procedures—Women (Distance to Frontier) 54 59 23 0 100 
Number of Days Required—Women (Distance to Frontier) 68 80 29 0 100 
Ease of Doing Business (Overall Index, Distance to Frontier) 75 80 18 2 100 
Enforcing Contracts  (Distance to Frontier) 56 58 14 2 93 
GDP per Capita (Constant US$) 12,927 4,883 18,192 218 111,968 
School Enrollment, Secondary (Gross), Gender Parity Index 0.98 1.00 0.14 0.36 1.42 
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Female Population Ages 15-64 (% of Total Population Ages 15-64) 50% 50% 4% 20% 55% 
Indicator Variable for Muslim Religious Majority in Country (share of countries 
in sample) 
24%     
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 54% 40% 45% 2% 312% 
Rule of Law Index -0.07 -0.27 0.98 -2.61 2.10 
Control of Corruption -0.06 -0.31 0.99 -1.87 2.47 
 
Table 2. Female Ownership in Response to New Business Creation 
 Dependent Variables 
 New Female LLC 
Owners (% of New 
LLC Owners) 
New LLCs with at Least 
One Female Business 
Owner (% of New LLCs) 
New Female Sole 
Proprietors (% of 
New Sole Proprie-
tors) 
New LLC Owners 0.13   
 (2.30)*   
New LLCs  0.21  
  (2.56)**  
New Sole Proprietors 0.18 
   (3.04)** 
Female Population Ages 15-
64 (% of Total Population 
Ages 15-64) 
1.13 0.00 0.91 
 (0.92) (0.00) (0.69) 
School Enrollment, Second-
ary (Gross), Gender Parity 
Index 
5.07 3.96 4.36 
 (5.95)** (4.47)** (5.00)** 
Year -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
 (-0.92) (-0.90) (-0.29) 
Constant 20.34 44.81 -6.77 
 (0.40) (0.65) (-0.13) 
Obs. 70 65 81 
R-Sq. Within 0.34 0.25 0.12 
R-Sq. Between 0.58 0.54 0.54 
R-Sq. Overall 0.63 0.60 0.56 
Note: All models in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are double-log specifications. t-ratios are shown in parentheses, where: 
** Indicates significance at the one percent level.  
*  Indicates significance at the five percent level 
 
Table 3. Dependent Variable: New Female Sole Proprietors (% of New Sole Proprietors) 
Number of Entry Procedures—Women (Distance to Frontier) 0.91    
 (1.97)*    
Number of Days Required—Women (Distance to Frontier) 0.86   
  (2.17)*   
Ease of Doing Business (Overall Index, Distance to Frontier) 1.70  
   (2.12)*  
Enforcing Contracts  (Distance to Frontier) 0.96 
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    (2.18)* 
GDP per Capita (Constant US$) 0.25 0.24 0.30 0.19 
 (1.68) (1.46) (1.97)* (1.47) 
School Enrollment, Secondary (Gross), Gender Parity Index 4.57 4.86 4.83 3.73 
 (4.78)** (4.49)** (4.68)** (4.66)** 
Female Population Ages 15-64 (% of Total Population Ages 15-64) 1.38 1.43 1.48 0.97 
 (0.99) (0.93) (1.03) (0.75) 
Indicator Variable for Muslim Religious Majority in Country 0.11 0.05 0.30 0.18 
 (0.31) 0.13 0.91 0.64 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.99) (-1.36) (-1.55 (-1.89) 
Rule of Law Index -0.46 -0.44 -0.50 -0.27 
 (-1.29) -1.16) -1.43) -0.78) 
Control of Corruption 0.66 0.66 0.74 0.56 
 (2.15)* (1.99)* (2.45)** (1.88) 
Year -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-0.79) (-0.76) (-0.86) (-0.66) 
Constant 16.28 11.75 12.15 14.07 
 (0.28) (0.21) (0.22) (0.25) 
Obs. 79 76 80 79 
R-Sq. Within 0.12 0.21 0.18 0.13 
R-Sq. Between 0.68 0.65 0.65 0.71 
R-Sq. Overall 0.71 0.69 0.70 0.73 
 
Table 4. Dependent Variable: Women in Wage Employment in the Nonagricultural Sector (% of Total 
Employment in the Nonagricultural Sector) 
Number of Entry Procedures—Women (Distance to Frontier) 0.004    
 (0.49)    
Number of Days Required—Women (Distance to Frontier) 0.02   
  (2.51)**   
Ease of Doing Business (Overall Index, Distance to Frontier) 0.07  
   (3.65)**  
Enforcing Contracts  (Distance to Frontier) 0.15 
    (3.88)** 
GDP per Capita (Constant US$) 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (2.82)** (2.07)** (2.59)** (2.22)* 
School Enrollment, Secondary (Gross), Gender Parity Index 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.14 
 (2.28)* (2.53)* (2.11)* (2.39)* 
Female Population Ages 15-64 (% of Total Population Ages 15-64) 0.79 0.72 0.77 0.73 
 (3.83)** (3.45)** (3.72)** (3.62)** 









Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 0.0001 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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 (0.48) (0.30) (0.17) (0.55) 
Rule of Law Index -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 (-0.34) (-0.48) (-0.56) (-0.91) 
Control of Corruption -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-1.21) (-1.18) (-1.35) (-1.19) 
Year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (4.58)** (3.55)** (2.82)** (5.53)** 







Obs. 537 530 475 543 
R-Sq. Within 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 
R-Sq. Between 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72 
R-Sq. Overall 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.67 
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